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ABSTRACT
Public key infrastructure has been proposed as a promising foundation for verifying the authenticity of communicating
parties and transferring trust over the internet. One of the key issues in public key infrastructure is how to manage certificate
revocations.  Various technical solutions dealing with key revocation have been proposed. However, to the best of our best
knowledge, no rigorous efforts have been made to understand the behavior of certificate revocation requests based on
empirical data. Furthermore, there is no study on the managerial aspect of Certificate Revocation Release.
 In this study, based on the empirical data collected from VeriSign, we prove that a revocation system will become stable
after a period of time. We show that different certificate authorities should take different strategies for releasing different
types of certificate revocations. We also provide the exact steps by which certificate authorities can follow to derive optimal
releasing strategies.
Keywords
Public key infrastructure, public key certificate, certificate revocation list
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The pervasive impact of business computing has made information technologies (IT) and information sharing an
indispensable part of daily operations and the key to competitive success. It also exacerbates the problems of verifying the
authenticity of communicating parties and transferring trust over the internet.  It is believed that a lack of trust has inhibited
the widespread adoption and fast growth of e-commerce. The public key infrastructure (PKI) has been considered as a
promising foundation for solving these problems, especially in the context of secure electronic commerce. Since the
authenticity of PKI is achieved through the verification of digital certificates, it is crucial to understand the nature of digital
certificates in practice.
The glory of the PKI can be so dimmed if there is no efficient way to verify the validity of digital certificates. Checking the
authenticity and expiration date of a digital certificate is never sufficient enough as it is possible that a certificate has been
revoked before its expiration for various reasons, such as 1) key compromise, 2) certificate authority (CA) compromise, 3)
affiliation change, 4) superseded, or 5) cessation of operation (Jain). To make PKI a useful platform, it is critical to manage
the certificate revocations efficiently. Previous research has concentrated on the technical side of CRL, and no rigorous
efforts have been made to understand the empirical nature of revocation request and managerial perspective of CRL release.
 One conclusion of previous research is that a CA should release Certificate Revocation Release (CRL) at a fixed time
interval because consumers may not need the most current CRL (Rivest, 1998). As long as a user has a CRL that is recent
enough to meet its operational requirement, it is acceptable in practice (Li and Feigenbaum, 2001). Unfortunately, all the
conclusions are based on some theoretical arguments; there is a lack of guidance for CA operations. Given a recency
requirement to be set by the consumers, a CA must understand the following aspects for setting an optimal CRL releasing
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policy: 1) Why a CA needs to follow a given time interval? How to compute that time interval? Will the interval be the same
for a new type of certificates versus a type of certificates that has been provided by a CA for a certain period of time? 2) Will
the interval be the same for a mature CA versus a Start-up CA? 3) If a CA does follow a given CRL releasing interval, how
does it know whether that interval is optimal or not?
In this paper, we study how often a CA should release its CRLs. We concentrate our analysis on CRL because it is the most
common and simplest method for certificate revocation (Jain). We have several interesting findings: 1) the probability that a
certificate being revoked is a decreasing function over the certificate's life cycle. People tend to think this probability either
flat over time (as memory-less Poisson) or increasing over time. 2) CAs should take different strategies for publishing
certificate revocation lists when dealing with a new type of certificates versus a re-serving type of certificates. 3) A mature
CA and a start-up CA should also take different strategies for releasing CRLs. 4) We give an optimal releasing strategy for
CA  to  balance  the  trade-off  between  cost  and  risk.  In  a  very  general  case,  a  mature  CA  who  deals  with  just  one  type  of
certificates can save almost 40,000 dollars more over one-year operation if it follows our strategy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: First, we briefly review the major concerns about the public key revocation.  Then
we show empirically how we collect data and derive the revocation distribution. Next, based on the empirical distribution, we
prescribe CA an optimal CRL releasing strategy. Finally we conclude our paper with a discussion of contributions,
limitations, and future research directions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since its introduction, the public key infrastructure (Housley, Ford, Polk and Solo, 1999) has provided a promising
foundation for verifying the authenticity of public keys and for transferring trust among users or business partners.  One
major issue in PKI management is how to revoke a certificate before its expiration. It has been argued that the running
expenses of a PKI derive mainly from administering revocation (Stubblebine, 1995).
The certificate revocation list (CRL) mechanism was introduced in 1988 and since then it remains the most common and
simplest method for certificate revocation. A CRL is a time-stamped list of certificates which have been revoked before their
expiration. A CA issues a signed CRL periodically so as to maintain a good synchronization between certificate users and
revocation source. Rivest (Rivest, 1998) proposed an alternative solution, short-lived certificates, to eliminate CRLs. The
major drawbacks of this approach include a high burden placed on certificate servers which need to sign more certificates, as
well as the problem of key compromise which cannot be addressed without using a separate mechanism (McDaniel and
Rubin, 2001).
Several alternatives to the CRL mechanism have been proposed by various researchers, such as certificate revocation system
(CRS) introduced by Micali (Naor and Nissim, 1998), certificate revocation tree (CRT) (Kocher, 1998) and on-line certificate
status protocol (OCSP) (Myers Ankney, Malpani, Galperin and Adams, 1999). Each alternative method has advantage and
disadvantage (Naor and Nissim, 1998; Kocher, 1998; Myers et al., 1999) in real operational system.
Researchers have also studied various aspects of certificate revocations including the meaning of revocation (Fox and
LaMacchia, 1998; Gunter and Jim, 2000), the model of revocation (Cooper, 1999), communication cost of revocation (Naor
et al., 1998), tradeoffs in certificate revocation schemes (Zheng, 2003), and risk management in certificate revocation (Li et
al., 2001). Though various tradeoffs have been studied for different revocation options, no attempt has been made to
understand the probability distribution of request for certificate revocation. In this paper, we conduct such research for CRL
releasing mechanism based on real data, and give concrete guidance for the optimal operation of CA in various scenarios.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we study how often a CA should release its CRLs to minimize its operational cost over a given period. Here we
define “how often” as the optimal time interval between two successive CRLs being released. There are several key
assumptions in our study: 1) This is a monopoly case, which means either there is just one CA in the system or different CAs
provide different types of certificate services; and 2) CA already decides the issued age of a given type of certificates, where
issued age is defined as the time difference between the expired date and the issued date. To get started we assume CA issues
one type of certificates with the same issued age. These certificates are independent and identical in terms of risk and cost.
Later we will move on to more general cases.
Normally CA takes a batch process for CRL release. There is a trade-off between cost and risk. In the case that consumer
files a revocation request to CA but CA does not release a CRL on time, we assume that CA will bear the liability cost if
there is any damage occurred between request filing and CRL releasing. Each time CA releases a CRL, it incurs both fixed
cost component and variable cost component. The fixed cost does not change with the length of CRL. It indicates a fixed
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dollar amount each time CA spends for releasing one CRL, regardless of the number of certificates in that CRL. Variable cost
is the cost associated with processing each individual certificate revocation request.
If CA releases the CRL too often, its liability cost is low, but its fixed cost and variable cost will be high. On the other hand,
the  saving  on  fixed  cost  and  variable  cost  might  not  be  offset  by  the  increasing  liability  cost  if  CA  releases  the  CRL  too
rarely. So CA needs to find an optimal interval for CRL release. In order to find this solution, CA must know the CRL length
on a given day if it  decides to publish CRL on that day. The length of CRL at any time t is related to three components: 1)
Length of CRL at any time t-1. 2) How many revoked certificates including in the CRL at time t-1 will be expired at time t.
According to CRL policy, if the certificate is expired, it should be excluded from CRL. 3) How many new revocation
requests it will receive from time t-1 to t.
For ease of reference, Table 1 lists all the notation that will be used in this paper.
Parameter Meaning of Parameter
a Max number of days between two successive CRL released dates that is accepted
by customers.
b The average percentage of certificates revoked among that type of certificates
issued.
c The number of days between two CRL releasing dates.
t Time parameter in the function of R(t),which is R(t) = ke –kt
?t Time interval between two generations of CRLs.
X Date on which certificates get issued.
k Coefficient in the function of R(t),which is R(t) = ke –kt
n Numbers of generations.
v Any time between 0 and ? in the f(v) and F(v).
? Number of certificates issued at different times.
? Issued Age of CRL, which is equal to Expired Date minus Issued Date.
? Stable number of certificates in CRL on a given day after ? if CA decides to
release CRL on that day.
FC The fixed cost of CA for publishing one CRL
VC The constant unit cost of CA for including one certificate into the CRL.
? The expected risk/liability per revocation cost for CA for delaying publish that
revocation for one day
f(v) The number of new certificate revocation between day v and day v+?t.
F(v) The valid cumulative number of certificate revocation from time 1 to v.
Table 1. Notation
DATA COLLECTION
How many new revocation requests a CA received from time t-1 to t is really driven by the probability distribution of
certificate revocation requests. From September 7th, 2005 to September 13th, 2005, we collected a series of CRLs from
VeriSign.com. As one of the biggest Certificate Authority in the world, VeriSign provides variant types of certificates and
publishes different CRLs periodically. We randomly choose five different CRL files from VeriSign website, which belong to
five different classes. Table 2 provides the descriptions for these 5 CRL files which have 39,243 total revocation records.
When a certificate is issued, its validity is limited by an expiration date. Note that the definition of issued age is:
Issued Age =Expired Date - Issued Date
However, there are circumstances where a certificate must be revoked prior to its expiration date. Thus, the truly existence
age of the certificate is the time between the issued date and the revoked date.
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Existence Age = Revoked Date -Issued Date
A certificate is valid for its issued age unless it is revoked. Each revoked certificate in a CRL is identified by its certificate
serial number and the revoked date. Based on the serial number of a given certificate, we searched the VeriSign online
database to get both the issued date and the expired date correspondingly. We cleaned those error records whose revoked date
was later than the expired date or whose issued date was later than the revoked date.
File Name Issuer Publishing
Time
Purpose No. of
Items
Max
Existence
Age(Days)
Signature
Algorithm
Class3Code
Signing2001.crl
VeriSign
Class 3 Code
Signing 2001
CA
September
04, 2005
6:00:08 PM
Code signing and object signing
certificates used for Netscape browsers,
Microsoft Internet Explorer browsers,
Sun Java Signing, et al.
1,993 380 md5RSA
CSC3-2004.crl VeriSign
Class 3 Code
Signing 2004
CA
September
11, 2005
6:00:25 PM
Same as VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing
2001 except used for certificates with
different expiration date. 228 364 md5RSA
Class3NewOFX.crl VeriSign
Class 3 Open
Financial
Exchange CA
September
11, 2005
6:00:15 PM
Open financial exchange certificates,
used for authenticating and securing
commerce on the Internet. 515 302 md5RSA
RSASecureServer.crl RSA Secure
Server CA
September
08, 2005
6:00:25 PM
Secure server certificates used by a
Root CA for managing PKI for SSL
Customers and VTN Affiliates. 14,837 727 md5RSA
SVRIntl.crl VeriSign
International
Server CA
Class 3
September
08, 2005
6:00:16 PM
Global server certificates for managing
PKI for SSL (Premium Edition)
customers and VTN Affiliates. 21,839 720 md5RSA
Table 2. Descriptions of CRL Files
DATA ANALYSIS
We compute the summary statistics for our data. The average issued age of these CRLs is 493 days, while the average
existence age is much shorter, only 31 days. To further demonstrate what is happening here, we plot the number of
revocations against existence age in Figure 1, and the percentage of revocations against existence age in Figure 2 for classes
RSASecureServer and SVRIntl.
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Figure 1. Number of Revocations Vs. Existence Age Figure 2. Probability of Revocation Vs. Existence Age
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The most interesting finding is that most of the certificate revocations occur at the first few days after issued, and the
percentage of revocations decreases with elapsed time. More than 30% of revocations occur within the first two days after
certificates get issued. This distribution pattern is very robust, and it is insensitive to which CRLs we investigated and which
years we selected. It still holds when we pool five CRLs together.
Empirical Model
In  order  to  get  the  size  of  CRL  at  any  time  t,  we  must  know  the  behavior  of  the  probability  density  function  (PDF)  of
certificate revocations over time. In the above, empirically we already show that the percentage of revocations decreases with
elapsed time. Next statistically we derive the underline PDF.
Underlying PDF for Certificates Issued at a Particular Time
We assume that there are ? certificates issued at time X with issued age ?. To get start, we assume that ? is a constant
number. Later we change ? to a random number with a Poisson distribution to study the more general case. From time X to
time X+?, on average ?b% of the certificates will be revoked. At time X+?, all the certificates issued at time X will be
expired, no matter whether they have been revoked or not. Let R(t) be the probability that any given certificate issued at time
X will be revoked in the interval [t, t+ ? t], where t is between X and X+?. It also represents the revoked percentage, which is
the number of revocations occurred in the interval [t, t+?t] divided by the total number of revocations occurred between X
and X+? (i.e., ?b%). Following the empirical distribution observed in Figure 2, we use an exponential probability density
function to model this distribution.
R(t) = ke –kt                                                                                                (1)
We use Maximum Absolute Deviation (MAD) to determine the parameter k. The MAD is proposed by Kolmogorov-
Smirnov. It minimizes the largest gap between the cumulative relative frequency of a given data set and that of its fitted
statistical distribution. In Figure 3, we present both the real empirical data and theoretically fitted PDF.1 The PDF fits the
empirical data very well when the parameter k is equal to 0.26, which is accepted at a 99% confidence interval.
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Figure 3. Empirical Data Vs. Fitted Exponential PDF
 A Model for Pooling Certificates Issued at Different Time
In the previous section, we only consider the PDF of one population of certificates issued at time X.  Now consider that CA
issues certificates at different time. Each generation of certificates is composed of certificates issued at a particular time with
the same issued age ?, where the time interval between two successive generations is ?t. At any give time interval [t..t+?t],
the revocation requests CA received originate from different generations.
1 We delete those records whose existence ages are zero.
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The Number of New Revocation Requests
The PDFs of revocations from different generations of certificates follow the same exponential probability density
R(t) = ke –kt as shown in Figure 4. Suppose that v is any time in (0, ?]. Let f(v) be the number of new certificate revocations
between day v and day v+?t, from all the validate generations.
                f(v) = %ba × ×R(v) + %ba × ×R(v-?t)+ %ba × ×R(v-2?t )+… + %ba × ×R[v-(n-1) ?t]                                                (2)
where n is the number of generations in time period ?, n=
t
bé ù
ê úDê ú
.
Assuming that ?t is one day, and that v is an integer, where v is in (0, ?], then we get the following equation.
f(v)= %ba × ×R(1)+ %ba × ×R(2)+… . %ba × ×R(v) = 1 %
1
vk
k
k
eb k e
e
a
-
-
-
-
× × ×
-
                                                                        (3)
When v is in (?, +?),
     f(v) = %ba × ×R(1)+ %ba × ×R(2)+… . %ba × ×R(?) = 1 %
1
k
k
k
eb k e
e
b
a
-
-
-
-
× × ×
-
                                                                    (4)
Figure 4. Model for Pooling Revocations from
Different Generations
Equation 3 and 4 show that f(v) decreases with a decreasing rate as time elapses from day 0 until day ?. After that, it becomes
a constant number. Figure 5 shows the number of new certificate revocations on daily basis in (0,2?] for the case where
?=1000,  b%=10%,  k=0.26,  and  ?=36  day.  From  now  on  we  omit  the  graph  for  (m?,  (m+1)?],  where  m  >=2,  because  the
shape in those regions are the same as that in (?, 2?].
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Figure 5. f(v) Behavior: The Number of New
Certificate Revocations on Daily Basis
The Size of CRL
The CRL, if issued on day v, includes the new revocation requests on day v as well as the valid historical revocation requests
(occurred before day v) whose expiration day is later than v.  Let F(v) be the valid cumulative number of certificate
revocations from time 1 to v, where “valid” means not expired. This is also the size for the CRL if CA decides to publish it
on that day. For any time v?(0, ?], we have
   F(v) =
1
( )
v
t
f t
=
å  =
1
1%
1
tkv
k
k
t
eb k e
e
a
-
-
-
=
-
× × ×
-å
= % [ (1 )]
1 1
k k
vk
k k
b k e ev e
e e
a - - -
- -
× × ×
- -
- -
                                                               (5)
The rest may be deduced similary. For any v???, +?), we have
   F(v) = F(?) =
1
( )
t
f t
b
=
å = % [ (1 )]1 1
k k
k
k k
b k e e e
e e
ba b
- -
-
- -
× × ×
- -
- -
                                                                                           (6)
Equations 5 and 6 show that F(v) is a convex function. It  increases with an increasing rate as time elapses from day 0 until
the time reaches issued age ?. After that, it becomes a constant number. The reason it is not going to be infinite is that at any
time some revoked certificates may be expired and removed from CRL. Figure 6 shows the daily CRL size in (0,2?] for the
case of ?=1000, b%=10%, k=0.26, and ?=36 days.
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Figure 6. F(v) Behavior: Daily Size of CRL
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In the above, we assume that CA issues a fixed number of certificates at different time and prove that the size of CRL will
become stable after issued age ?. A more general case is that CA issues ? certificates, where ? is a random number following
a Poisson distribution.  Because the form F(v) is messy, we conduct simulation to study the prosperities of F(v) when ?  is a
random number. We find that with reasonable big ?, even with Poisson distribution, the size of CRL becomes stable after
issued age ?. Because of the existence of the similarity between the fixed number case and the Poisson distribution case for
the F(v) distribution, later for our economic analysis, we will focus on the fixed number case.
Analytical Model: How Often Should CA Release CRLs
The key research question in our paper is to give a prescription to CA to decide how often it should release its CRLs. In order
to answer that question, CA must know the probability distribution of new certificate revocation f(v) and the distribution of
certificate revocation list F(v). CA needs to balance the liability cost of not releasing CRL on time and the fixed and variable
costs of releasing CRL too often. So the goal for CA is to minimize the overall operational cost. Because the behaviors of f(v)
and F(v) when time t is greater than ? are different from those when time t is smaller than ?, we analyze the optimal strategies
for CA for these two cases separately. For each case we assume a monopoly case so that there is no competition between
CAs, and that the certificates are homogeneous in terms of risk, cost, and revocation probability. Also, different types of
certificates are independent from each other.
CA will get an optimal CRL releasing strategy for each type of certificates based on properties of the certificates. Because the
sizes of CRLs are stable after ?, CA can take either a fixed interval strategy or a fixed CRL size strategy. Because these two
strategies are inter-changeable, for simplicity reason, we present our solution for the fixed interval strategy.
Optimal Releasing Strategy When Time is Greater Than ?
When time is greater than ?, CA has run certificate services for at lease one issued age for that type of certificates. We will
use these variables in our analysis (the number in parentheses is the default value in our simulation).
l ?: The issued age of one type of CRL. (?=360)
l c: Estimated numbers of days between two CRLs releasing date . This is the decision variable that CA needs to
optimize.
l ?: Estimated numbers of certificates in a CRL on a given day after issued age ? if CA decides to release CRLs on that
day. According to case before, ?=F(?)= % [ (1 )]
1 1
k k
k
k k
b k e e e
e e
ba b
- -
-
- -
× × ×
- -
- -
 .(?=32000, k=0.26, and ?=360).
l FC: The fixed cost for CA to publish one CRL.(FC=$10,000)
l VC: The variable cost for CA to include each individual certificate into the CRL. We assume the VC does not change.
(VC=$1)
l ?: The expected liability cost per certificate revocation of CA for delaying publishing the revocation for one day; i.e., the
risk of delaying publishing a CRL of ? certificate revocations for n day is nq¡ × × .  If  we  assume  that  for  the  whole
period of ? ,  the expected liability cost that CA pays for the accident caused by delaying publishing CRLs is Qm (i.e.,
Qm= $100,000), then ?=Qm/???=$ 0.0087.
l a: Recency requirement set up by the customers. It is the max number of days between two successive CRLs releasing
date that is acceptable by customers. (a=50 days)
If CA releases one CRL every c days, the total cost of CA within period ? is
cost(c) =
1
0
[ n ]
c
n
FC VC
c
q
b
q
-
=
¡ × × + + × ×å                                                                                                     (15)
Optimization Model
 The problem converts into the following optimization problem:
min cos ( )
. . 0, 0,
t c
s t FC VC c a
ì
í >> > ¡ > £î
                                                                                                                (16)
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According to Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem (Polak,1971),2 we get
[cos ( ) ( )] 0
0
0
( ) 0
t c L c a
c
c a
L
L c a
¶ + × -ì =ï ¶ïï - £í
ï ³
ï
× - =ïî
                                                                                                                                                     (17)
In order for ( ) 0L c a× - = , we need either L=0 or c-a=0.
?If L=0, then
[cos ( ) ( )] 0
0
t c L c a
c
c a
¶ + × -ì =ï
¶í
ï - £î
                                                                                                                                                     (18)
Compute the first derivation of cost with respect to c, and the optimal result c0 is
0
0
2 FCc VC
c a
q
ì æ öæ ö= +ï ç ÷ç ÷¡í è øè ø
ï £î
,                                                                                                                                                        (19)
Compute the second derivation of cost with respect to c, and the result is
2
2 3
cos ( ) 2( )t c FC VC
c c
b q b¶ × + × ×
=
¶
                                                                                                                                       (20)
Because the second derivation of cost(c) at point c0 is
0
2
2
cos ( ) 0
2 ( )
c c
t c VC
c FC VC
b
q
=
¶ ¡ × ×
= >
¶
+
¡
,                                                                                                                                   (21)
Cost(c) achieves the minimum value at c0.  In  this  case,  the  minimum  operational  cost  of  CA  is
0 1
0 0
[ ( )
2 1]
2
c
n
FCn FC VC VC
c
q q b
bq
q
-
=
¡ × × = ¡ × ×
æ öæ ö+ + × × + -ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
å .
?If c-a=0, the function is
2 02
FC VCL
t
c a
b q b q b× + × × ¡ × ×ì = - ³ï
í
ï =î
                                                                                                                                   (22)
 The  minimal  cost  of  CA  is  fixed  and  equal  to
1
0
[ ( )
1] 1 ( )
2
a
n
an FC VC FC VC
a a
q q b
b b
q q
-
=
¡ × × ¡ × × ++ + × × = × - + ×å  when
2 FCa VC
q
æ öæ ö£ +ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
2 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition is a solution to solve constrained optimization problems.
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The minimum releasing interval CA should follow is either a or
0
2 FCc VC
q
æ öæ ö= +ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
 depending on whether
2 FC VC
q
æ öæ ö+ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
is greater than a or not. It is clear that
0
2 FCc VC
q
æ öæ ö= +ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
 is an increasing function of FC and VC, but a
decreasing function of ? and ?, where ?=F(?). That means if fixed cost and variable cost are higher, or the risk is lower, or the
issued age of the certificate is smaller, CA should release CRL less frequently.
Value Study:
In this section, we use an numerical example to demonstrate how much money CA can save by following our strategy. The
best waiting days to achieve the minimal cost is
0
2 FCc VC
q
æ öæ ö= +ç ÷ç ÷¡è øè ø
=17.37?a=50 days. Figure 7 shows the total cost for CA
by using different releasing strategies. If CA deviates from the 0c  =17 by using 2*c0 =34, CA ends up spend almost 400, 000
dollars for just one type of certificates within a period of ?. This is not a trivial number given that there are multiple CAs
providing numerous certificate services.
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Figure 7. The Total Cost of CA with Different Releasing
Interval after ?
 Optimal Releasing Strategy When Time is Smaller Than ?
Similar to the analysis given for the case when time is greater than ?, we can obtain the cost function when the time is smaller
than ?:
Cost(c)=
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Value Study:
Figure 8 shows3 the total cost for CA by using different releasing intervals. The minimal cost is $ 2.08603*105 when c=28
days.  This  means  that  when  time  is  smaller  than  ?,  CA  should  release  CRLs  once  every  28  days.  Recall  that  the  optimal
interval is 17 days when time is greater than ?. It is easy to know that cost(17) = $ 2.64014*105 >cost(28)= $ 2.08603*105 in
the period of (0, ?]; therefore, CA should take different strategies for time periods (0, ?] and (?, +?).
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Unlike most previous research, this study uses empirical data collected from VeriSign to investigate the behavior of
certificate revocations and CRL releasing strategy. There are several key contributions of our paper: 1) We prove that a
revocation system will become stable after a period of time; 2) CA should also take different strategies when providing
certificate services for a new type of certificates versus a re-serving type of certificates; 3) A start-up CA and a grown-up CA
should take different strategies for CRL release; 4) We give the exact steps by which that CA can follow to derive optimal
CRL releasing strategies; and 5) We prove that if the fixed cost or the variable cost is higher, or the liability cost is lower, or
the issued age of the related certificates is shorter, CA should release CRLs less frequently.
There are several limitations for this study: 1) This paper takes a static approach by assuming that there is no correlation
between different types of certificates, and that customer behaviors do not affect CA's CRL releasing strategy. A more
realistic approach is to use game theory to model the interactions between CAs and customers; and 2) This paper assumes
that CA offers certificates with a fixed issued age. To further minimize the total operational cost, CA may optimize both
issued age and releasing time interval simultaneously. More insights can be revealed by future research conducted in the
above mentioned areas.
REFERENCES
1. A. Arnes. Public key certificate revocation schemes. Master’s thesis, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology,2000.
2. D. A. Cooper. A model of certificate revocation. In ACSAC’99: Proceedings of the 15th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, page 256, Washington, DC, USA, 1999. IEEE Computer Society.
3. Fox and LaMacchia. Certificate revocation: Mechanics and meaning. In FC: International Conference on Financial
Cryptography. LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
4. C. A. Gunter and T. Jim. Generalized certificate revocation. In Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,
pages 316-329,2000.
3 For demonstration purpose, we assume that a is big enough so that CA can adopt a fixed interval with any value.
 3334
Ma et al.  Optimal CRL Releasing Strategy in Public Key Infrastructure
Proceedings of the Twelfth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Acapulco, Mexico August 04th-06th 2006
5. R. Housley, W. Ford, W.Polk, and D.Solo. RFC 2459: Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate and CRL
profile, Jan.1999. Status: PROPOSED STANDARD.
6. G. Jain. Certificate revocation: A survey. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/519984.html.
7. P.C. Kocher. On certificate revocation and validation. In FC’98: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on
Financial Cryptography, pages 172-177, London, UK, 1998. Springer-Verlag.
8. N. Li and J. Feigenbaum. Nonmonotonicity, user interfaces, and risk assessment in certificate revocation (position
paper). In Proceedings of the 5th Internation Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC’01).
9. P. McDaniel and A. Rubin. A response to “can we eliminate certificate revocation lists?”. Lecture notes in Computer
Science, 1962:245+, 2001.
10. M.Myers, R. Ankney, A.Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams. S.509 internet public-key infrastructure?online certificate
status protocol (OCSP). Internet proposed standard RFC 2560, June 1999.
11. M. Naor and K. Nissim. Certificate revocation and certificate update. In Proceeding 7th USENIX Security Symposium
(San Antonio, Texas), Jan 1998.
12. R. L. Rivest. Can we eliminate certificate revocations lists? In Financial Cryptography, pages 178-183, 1998.
13. S. Stubblebine. Recent-secure authentication: Enforcing revocation in distributed systems. In Proceedings 1995 IEEE
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 224-234, May 1995.
14. P.Wohlmacher. Digital certificates: a survey of revocation methods. In MULTIMEDIA ’00: Proceedings of the 2000
ACM workshops on Multimedia, pages 111-114, New York, NY, USA, 2000. ACM Press.
15. P. Zheng. Tradeoffs in certificate revocation schemes. Computer Communication Review, 33(2):103-112, 2003.
16. E. Polak. Computational methods in optimization. 1971.
 3335
